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SOUTH CAROLINA'S JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: REFORM IN A
TRADITIONALISTIC SETTING

Steven W. Hays, University of South Carolina
Since the 1970s, South Carolina's judicial system has
experienced a remarkable transformation. Spurred on by a nation-wide
effort to modernize court operations, the state government has
implemented a variety of reforms that are intended to simplify the
judicial structure, to enhance the courts' ability to process cases
efficiently, and to ameliorate such age-old problems as antiquated
procedures and overlapping jurisdictions. Although these reforms have
not placed South Carolina in the forefront of the judicial modernization
movement, they have certainly improved the operation of the courts and
altered many of the traditional power relationships that once
characterized the State's legal system.
The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative
assessment of South Carolina's courts. Specifically, the progress of
judicial system reform in the State is evaluated in the context of
developments that have swept across the United States during the past
three decades. The inquiry is intended to determine if the State's
judicial system has progressed beyond its highly traditionalistic roots,
and to speculate as to probable direction of future reform attempts.

Courts and Political Culture
Judicial systems are, by almost any standard, the most
traditional of all political institutions. Th.is fact is attributable to at least
two characteristics of the judicial branch of government. First, the
courts' focus on law and procedure breeds conservatism.
Th.is
phenomenon is evident in the judges' adherence to stare decisis
(common law precedent), in the legal profession's fixation on Latin
terminology and archaic courtroom theatrics, and in the judiciary's
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fervent belief (one that is not always followed in practice) that due
process considerations take precedence over the needs for political
responsiveness, budgetary exigencies, or other competing demands.
Providing litigants with fair and impartial hearings is the putative goal,
one that relies heavily on time-honored traditions. Within this milieu,
the status quo is a seductive mistress.
This affection for tradition is reinforced by the dynamics that
surround the judicial system's place in the governmental system. From
its earliest origins in England , our justice system has exhibited a
conservative bent. Having been created and staffed by elites within
political and economic communities, American courts long served the
interests of legislative bodies and the propertied classes. Although this
situation has changed (at least in some areas) over the past 50 years,
the fact that courts are political institutions with strong ties to "the
establishment" cannot be overstated. Even those who argue that
"justice is blind" generally admit that status and influence creep through
Lady Justice's blindfold.
Despite their obviously political nature, judicial systems
typically maintain a polite fiction concerning their appropriate role in
the governmental structure. According to accepted convention, the
courts were never intended to accommodate changing public fashions,
but were supposed to be insulated from the ebb and flow of political
strife. As arbiters of controversial public and private disputes, and
with the ability to use their powers of judicial review to negate or alter
the actions of executive and legislative officials, every societal group
has an interest (at least theoretically) in maintaining the courts'
impartiality. For this reason, ~olitical systems at all levels of
government within the United States have long paid lip service to the
virtues of judicial independence.
For the first 150 years of our nation's history, state court
systems rarely (if ever) approached the idealized version of
independence that is popularized in high school civics books. The
courts were snared in a sticky political web; most were completely
reliant upon the other branches of government for financial support,
personnel, and even the procedures that they followed. At the urging
of such groups as the American Bar Association and the American
Judicature Society, however, state legislatures in this century began to
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take steps toward the creation of truly independent judiciaries. In
addition to being provided with greater control over their own
operations, the entire system of justice delivery in many states was
simplified and modernized. Because this process of court reform is
relatively recent, and since most states started from about the same
place in their journeys toward judicial modernization (i.e., the typical
court system started out as a vassal of the legislature), a status report
on the progress that has been made can provide some revealing insights
into the state's underlying political culture.
What traits should we expect to find in states with differing
political cultures? If we adapt Daniel Elazar's celebrated typology
(moralistic/ individualistic/ traditionalistic) to the courts, 1 it would
probably be safe to conclude that judicial independence and neutrality
are most highly valued in a moralistic political culture. In the pursuit
of "the public good," the integrity and independence of the state's
judicial system must be beyond reproach. Thus, we would expect the
court system to be relatively autonomous of legislative or executive
involvement. Judges would be selected in a relatively neutral and
equitable fashion, the judiciary's operating budget would be secure
from political manipulations, and judicial procedures would be the
exclusive province of the judges, not the legislature. In other words,
judges would rule their own house with a minimum of legislative or
executive intrusion.
Courts within an individualistic culture, in slight contrast,
would most likely emphasize such traits as efficiency and
responsiveness to public demands. Measures aimed at making the
courts accessible to the public would be of primary concern. In an
individualistic setting, then, we would anticipate the widespread use of
small claims courts, night courts, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
techniques, and other innovations that encourage the speedy settlement
of legal controversies. Instead of promoting the interests of society's
"haves"-a common phenomenon among judicial systems in every
political setting2-the judiciary would strive to level the playing field.
Groups such as landlords, creditors and employers would begin to lose
their long-standing advantages in the judicial system in response to
demands from tenants, debtors and employees. Likewise, a premium
would be placed on modernizing and streamlining judicial procedures
Volume 24, 1996 \ 205
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due to the fact that such measures would further enhance the courts'
ability to serve the public's private needs.
Judiciaries in traditionalistic political cultures, conversely, can
be expected to be neither responsive nor independent. As instruments
of the political elite, the courts would likely be kept in a subservient
role vis-a-vis the legislative and/or executive branches of government.
Politically charged judicial selection would be a probable fixture, as
would external controls over the judiciary's procedures, personnel, and
budgets. There would be few evident attempts to enlarge the public's
access to the courts, and even fewer measures designed to reverse the
traditional advantage of society's "haves" over the "have-nots". The
courts would be a conservative organ of the existing power structure.
Serving the elites would thus take precedence over such competing
values as efficiency, professionalism, responsiveness to the public, or
impartiality.

Court Reform Comes to South Carolina
In order to place South Carolina's judicial system in its
appropriate political context, it is first necessary to review the situation
before and after the reform movement. As was the case virtually
everywhere, the State's court system evolved over many years in a
haphazard and even chaotic fashion. The General Assembly, which
had seized control of the judicial branch immediately after the
Revolution, distrusted the idea of an independent judiciary due in part
to lingering memories of the abuses that had occurred under the King's
courts. Later, the legislature's suspicion of the legal system was
heightened by the attempts of some state judiciaries (but not South
Carolina's) to negate legislative actions through judicial review. 3 Fears
of similar behavior in this State, coupled with the low profesmonal
status of the legal profession, eliminated any reluctance that the General
Assembly might have had toward meddling in judicial affairs.
Instead of vesting significant powers in legislative committees
or a central appellate court, the General Assembly followed a
"strategy" of decentralization Wider which specialized courts were
created for cities and counties whenever the apparent need arose.
206 I The Journal of Political Science
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Because the legislature directly selected much of the judiciary, and
because the costs of new courts were largely borne by the jurisdictions
in which they were located, courts sprung up like mushrooms across
the South Carolina landscape.
The General Assembly quickly
developed a penchant for electing its own members, or close friends of
influential legislators, to most of the new judgeships. Meanwhile, the
process of court creation intensified throughout most of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. The movement was spurred by urbanization .
and industrializ.ation, both of which led to increased levels of litigation
and related demands for new types of courts to deal with emerging
classes of disputes (such as juvenile, landlord-tenant, and divorce
cases).
A predictable consequence of this evolutionary process was
that the resulting judicial "system" was little more than "a hodgepodge
of courts, lacking in uniformity and consistency. "4 Many of the courts
operated semi-autonomously, thereby developing highly inconsistent
procedures and jurisdictional responsibilities. In addition to creating
confusion among citizens and attorneys, this situation resulted in
significant differences in the quality of judicial services between and
among counties. The chaotic state of affairs prompted legal scholars
to apply such terms as "administrative swamp" and "judicial anarchy"
to the local justice system. 5
The extent of South Carolina's problem was brought into sharp
focus in 1971, when the Institute of Judicial Administration (a national
reform group) concluded that the existing labyrinth of courts with
overlapping and inconsistent jurisdictions "defies classification". 6 A
diagram of the state court system indicated that six types of trial courts
existed (magistrate , municipal, probate, domestic relations and
children's, county, and circuit) , yet no single judicial district contained
all of the types represented. Moreover , the pattern of lines of appeals
varied. Cases appealed from municipal court could, in some counties,
be taken to the county courts, while in other counties these cases were
reviewed by circuit courts. Adding to the confusion was the fact that
some county courts could hear only civil cases, with the jurisdictional
amounts varying by court, while others heard both civil and criminal
litigation. 1
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By the early 1970s, enormous pressures for court reform were
building within the legal profession and the public at large. These
forces were stimulated by a variety of factors, including dissatisfaction
with the different courts' vague and conflicting jurisdictions, a growing
problem with court delay, unevenness of judicial workloads, and
archaic facilities and recordkeeping practices. 8 After two centuries of
thoughtless inattention, the State' s court system seemed to be serving
no one ' s interests , save for a small group of judges and well-connected
associates.
Thanks largely to the efforts of a small group of progressive
legislators, who were motivated by a bar-sponsored citizens'
movement, court reform finally arrived in South Carolina in 1972. In
that year a revised version of the Judicial Article of the State
Constitution was approved by the voters. This article was intended to
establish a "unified court system" with consistent legal procedures and
uniform avenues of appeal. Although the Article formally took effect
in 1973, it did not immediately transform the state' s courts. Instead ,
the Article merely stated broad intentions regarding the structure and
administration of the unified court system, leaving the specifics to be
worked out over time. Thus , the revision of the Judicial Article set a
gradual and continuing process of court reform into motion .

Conventional Wisdom of Court Reform:
Attack on Traditionalism
Before exploring the specific changes that have occurred in
South Carolina's courts in the recent past, the reform tradition that
spawned these developments needs to be briefly examined. The
conventional wisdom of court reform first began to take shape in a
1906 address to the American Bar Association by Roscoe Pound , Dean
of the Harvard Law School. Pound chided his colleagues for their
complacency in the face of judicial ineptitude , and criticized three
specific aspects of court administration: court multiplicity (the existence
of too many specialized courts ), concurrent jurisdictions (overlapping
jurisdictions that permit litigants to select the courts to which they will
take their cases), and the resulting waste of judicial manpower.
208 I The Journal of Political Science
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In effect, these criticisms were an attack on the traditionalistic
practices that were prevalent in almost all states. Pound's proposed
solutions , meanwhile, are grounded largely in the themes that permeate
both moralistic and individualistic cultures. He argued that judicial
branches ought to be granted their independence from legislative
bodies. To accomplish this ambitious objective, he advocated the
creation of "unified court systems" under which the state's supreme
court would have administrative, budgetary, and procedural control
over all lower courts. In addition to granting the courts their
independence, the unified court concept implicitly advanced the goal of
making judicial systems more businesslike and efficient. By eliminating
legislative intrusions, and by providing the judiciary with a clear
administrative master, Pound hoped that the courts would begin to
function in a more responsible and effective manner.
Although Pound's indictment of the courts was not originally
well received by the legal profession, by 1938 the ABA had adopted
many of his proposals in its resolutions for judicial reform. These
resolutions , known as the Parker-Vanderbilt Standards,9 called for a
unified judicial organization in which the state's highest court would be
granted full administrative and rule-making authority over the entire
court system. These reform suggestions were expanded by the 1962
ABA Model State Judicial Article. In addition to advocating simplified
judicial structures and lear lines of administrative authority , the Model
Article included pleas for merit selection of judges, the appointment of
professional court administrators, and judicial discipline and removal
mechanisms. 10
The latest and most sophisticated reform recommendations, the
1990 ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization, 11 continue to
emphasize the themes of judicial independence and administrative
efficiency . The ABA's clear goal is to empower state court systems by
giving them centralized control over all facets of their operation, and
to ensure them a steady and reliable source of revenue that is not
dependent upon the other branches. Included within the ABA's most
strident suggestions are the elimination of all specialized courts, the
vesting of unrestricted administrative authority in the state 's highest
court (or its chief justice) , state financing of the judicial system (to
eliminate the courts ' reliance on unpredictable funding sources,) and
Volume 24, 1996 \ 209
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merit selection of judges (to reduce the lik.elihoodthat incompetent
judges obtain their positions through politicized, corrupt, or otherwise
unseemly processes). Obviously, this list of reforms echoes many
"good government" theliles, along with an undertone of "administntive
management" practices. Both moralistic and imividualistic elements
are clearly evident.

The Tense Path Toward Reform
Compared to the anarchy that prevailed prior to the adoption
of the new Judicial Article (Article 5), the current court system in
South Carolina is a model of simplicity and order. Although the
improvements did not always occur smoothly, the General Assembly
deserves credit for permitting the reform process to continue, however
gradually or reluctantly.
The most significant component of Article 5 originally
stipulated that "the judicial power of the state be vested in a unified
judicial system which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court,
and such other courts of limited jurisdiction as may be provided by
general law. " The Article went on to note that "any existing court may
be continued as authorized by law until this article is implemented
pursuant to such schedule as may hereafter be adopted. "
In effect, these provisions established a two-tier court system
(Supreme Court and Circuit Courts} but did not preclude the possibility
that existing specialized courts could continue indefinitely. Moreover,
the Article was sufficiently vague to leave the question open as to
whether or not the General Assembly was empowered to create new
courts that were not formally included in the unified system.
This situation resulted in a series of confrontations between the
General Assembly and the Supreme Court. In 1975, for example, the
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of29 statutes dealing with
the court system that had been passed after the adoption of Article 5.
These statutes created new local courts, added judgeships to courts that
already existed, and altered and/or established courts in the probate
court system. In every instance, the Supreme Court ruled that changes
in the judicial system that did not conform to the unification
210 / The Journal of Political Science
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requirement of Article 5 were unconstitutional . This series of
skirmishes was temporarily resolved in 1976, when the General
Assembly finally moved to implement a unified court structure. Specific
steps included the creation of a coherent family court structure in 1977,
the phase-out of county courts "and other similar courts inferior to the
circuit court " by 1979, and arrogation of authority over these lower
courts to the unified court system. 12
Despite these important advances, however, relations between
the General Assembly and the judiciary were anything but cordial. For
example, conflict erupted between 1979 and 1984 when the Supreme
Court's plea for the creation of an Intermediate Court of Appeals was
used by the General Assembly as a means to reassert its control over
the administrative and rulemaking authority of the unified court system.
In a tug-of-war spanning five years, the General Assembly attempted
on different occasions to dilute the Supreme Court's rulemaking
authority by granting the new appeals court (instead of the Supreme
Court) control over its own internal procedures, and by making all
rulemaking actions of the court system "subject to and not inconsistent
with statutory law. "13 The General Assembly's irritation with the
judicial branch had been inflamed in 1979 when the Supreme Court
declared that the legislature could not appoint four of its incumbent
members to seats on the new appeals court (which had been created on
a temporary basis by statute). That action was ruled invalid because it
conflicted with a statute that prohibited any legislator from being
elected to an office created during his/her term in the General
Assembly.
After five years of highly embarrassing squabbles, a truce was
finally declared in 1984. The Court of Appeals was permanently
established through a constitutional referendum, and the General
Assembly abandoned its attempts to take back the Supreme Court's
hard-won authority over management and rulemaking for the unified
judicial system. Relative peace has prevailed since 1984, save for
intermittent
controversies
surrounding
judicial
elections.
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The Reformed Judicial Structure
The gradual revisions in court structure have resulted in a table
of judicial organization that is not extremely different from the one
advocated by the ABA standards. Compared to the confusing array of
courts that existed prior to reform, the system presently consists of a
two-tier trial court arrangement and two levels of appellate courts.
Additionally, the system contains a number of specialized courts at the
local and county levels (Figure 1).
The most numerous courts in the State are "limited
jurisdiction," meaning that they are restricted to hearing minor criminal
and civil cases. The State's 295 (approximately) magistrate courts have
jurisdiction over criminal offenses "subject to the penalty or fine not
exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days. "14 Their civil
jurisdiction extends to cases involving up to $5,000.
The 201
municipal courts, which can be created by action of any local governing
body, have no civiljurisidiction. Their criminal jurisdiction is identical
to that of the magistrate courts; they are intended to adjudicate minor
legal violations that occur within the city boundaries. Many municipal
courts are staffed by magistrates in contractual arrangements handled
through the county governments (for whom the magistrates technically
work); the remaining municipal court judges are chosen by their
jurisdictions' governing bodies.
Magistrates, whose offices originated during the colonial era,
perform two critical functions in addition to deciding cases. They
conduct pre-trial and preliminary hearings for all offenders charged
with crimes, and they issue search and arrest warrants when probable
cause exists. Given this range of responsibility, it is notable that
magistrates are not required to be attorneys. In fact, the only statutory
requirement is that they be qualified electors in the counties in which
they intend to serve. And, significantly, the absence of a law degree
does not appear to figure prominently in the selection process; only a
small percentage of the sitting magistrates possess formal legal training.
They are appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the
Senate; under the system of "senatorial courtesy," this means that
Senators effectively control magisterial appointments within their
counties.
212 / The Journal of Political Science
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The next highest tier of courts includes two "special
jurisdiction" bodies, family courts and probate courts . Prior to court
reform , several counties contained no special courts for family matters
while others employed either domestic relations courts or juvenile
courts. This situation was resolved in 1976 when the Family Court
System was created . These courts are the sole forum for cases
pertaining to marriage, divorce , separation , custody , visitation,
termination of parental rights, alimony, and name changes. They also
have exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles who are charged with crimes.
Family court judges are elected by the General Assembly for four-year
terms. Under the unified court system, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court appoints one family court judge to serve as Chief
Judge. This individual is the administrative head of the Family Court
system, and hasthe power to supervise the business of the court and to
reassign the 49 family court judges for maximum efficiency.
The second major court of special jurisdiction, the probate
courts , supervise the disposition of estates and resolve disputes arising
from contested wills . Other functions include issuance and recording
of marriage licenses and supervision of guardians for minors . Each
county in the State contains a probate court. Probate judges are
popularly elected within their counties to four-year terms . The only
statutory requirement for the office is that the candidate be a qualified
elector of the county .
The next tier in the judicial hierarchy, the circuit courts,
represent the "workhorses" of the South Carolina judicial system. As
trial courts of general jurisdiction, they decide all cases except those for
which exclusive jurisdiction is reserved to courts of limited or special
jurisdiction . Thus, the circuit courts hear civil cases exceeding $5,000
in value, and criminal cases in which the possible penalties are greater
than $500 or 30 days in jail. They also have authority to hear cases de
novo or on appellate review from the inferior courts (every litigant who
is tried before a non-attorney judge or magistrate is entitled to such
review). Each circuit is divided into a court of common pleas for civil
matters and a court of general sessions for criminal cases. The state
is currently divided into 16 judicial districts which range in size from
two to four counties. The General Assembly, which elects circuit court
judges, has set the number of judgeships at 43. Each district in the
214 / The Journal of Political Science
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state is assigned a resident judge, and the remaining judges are subject
to rotation within their own circuits or to other circuits if a caseload
imbalance is present.
The state ' s appellate courts consist of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, which is composed of a
Chief Justice and four associate justices, is primarily occupied with
reviewing cases that are appealed to it on errors of law. Beyond its
decision-making capacity, the court has extensive responsibility and
power as the procedural rule-making and administrative authority for
the unified judicial system. Justices of the Supreme Court are selected
by vote of the General Assembly to serve ten-year terms.
With the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1983, the
Supreme Court reserved jurisdiction over cases on certiorari
(discretionary appeal) from the new appellate courts, as well as five
classes of appeal directly from lower trial courts. These include cases
involving the death penalty, public utility rates, major constitutional
issues, public bond issues, and the election laws. 15 All other classes of
appellate litigation are now heard by the Court of Appeals, which was
created expressly to reduce the Supreme Court's decisional burden.
This intermediate appellate court consists of a Chief Judge and seven
associate judges who are elected by the General Assembly to staggered
terms of six years.

Assessing the Reforms: How Does South Carolina Compare?
As has been noted, South Carolina's current judicial system
represents a profound improvement over the depressing situation that
existed prior to the revision of Article 5. Many of the worst vestiges
of the old traditionalistic system have been abolished and replaced with
structures and practices that adhere fairly closely to the ABA's
prescribed model. Each step toward a unified court system takes the
system farther away from its tradition-bound past.
Despite making impressive strides, however, the state's courts
do not always compare favorably with the level of progress that has
been made elsewhere. Some of the remaining problems are relatively
minor, yet others constitute serious challenges to the reform
Volume 24, 1996 \ 215
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agendaand to the courts' efforts to modernize and to reinforce their
fledgling independence.

Structural Comparisons: A Status Report
The creation of the unified court system is clearly South
Carolina's most significant reform achievement. Although impressive
structural alterations have been implemented, the system remains a
considerable distance from the model espoused by the ABA. The
primary area of inconsistency concerns the ABA recommendation
governing trial courts of original jurisdiction. The ABA prescribes a
single court with general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters.
This idea dates all the way back to Roscoe Pound, who argued for
"specialized judges, not specialized courts!" 16 Where this format bas
been employed in other states, the court is usually divided into judicial
departments that specialize in various classes of disputes (e.g., civil,
criminal, traffic, probate, juvenile, domestic). By placing all of these
judicial functions in one court, tinder a single chief (administrative)
judge, most commentators agree that judicial efficiency will improve
and the consistency and quality of justice will be enhanced.
In order to conform to the "ideal" structure, South Carolina
would need to abolish several courts-magistrate, municipal, family,
and probate-and assign their functions to the circuit courts. Because
of the existence of these special and limited jurisdiction courts, the state
ranks in the bottom 40 percent of all states on a "court consolidation
and unification" scale. 17 Although less than ten states currently have
just one trial court of general jurisdiction, over 30 states contain
judicial structures with fewer separate courts than are now present in
South Carolina. The most common arrangement is a two-tier court
structure consisting of a county court (limited jurisdiction) and a circuit
(often called "superior") court of general jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most disturbing trait of the current arrangement is
the continued presence of restricted jurisdiction courts staffed by nonattorney judges.
Astoundingly, magistrate and municipal courts
adjudicate over 1.5 million cases per year, 18 a number that far exceeds
the total output of all the other courts combined. Even though
216 / The Journal of Political Science
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these cases are relatively "minor" (predominantly traffic offenses,
ordinance violations, and minor civil claims), the involvement of nonattorney judges raises serious questions about the quality and fairness
of the proceedings.

Administrative Arrangements: Not Quite Independent
Prior to reform, South Carolina's courts were a leaderless
array of loosely connected entities. Except for the General Assembly,
which frequently imposed rules and regulations, there was no
administrative accountability.
Without any coherent direction,
personnel were not efficiently utilized, financial resources were
maldistributed, and the courts' operating practices varied widely across
the state.
The revision of Article 5 addressed these traditonal dilemmas
by vesting administrative and rule-making authority within the Supreme
Court. Under Section 4 of the Article, the Chief Justice is designated
as the administrative head of the unified judicial system. To carry out
his administrative mission, the Chief Justice has constitutional power
to appoint an administrator for the courts and such assistants as he
deems necessary. Consistent with ABA recommendations, the Office
of South Carolina Court Administration was established in 1973 to
serve as the Chief Justice's administrative support staff. The diverse
functions of this office include: case tracking, calendar management,
provision of legal education for judges and other personnel, and
statistical compilations to aid the Chief Justice in making decisions
concerning resource allocations, the assignment of judges, and revisions
in judicial rules and procedures.
Collectively, these reforms provide the unified court system
with an unprecedented amount of control over its own affairs. If we
focus only on the concrete indicators- the existence of constitutional,
administrative, and rulemaking authority within the court system,
coupled with a cadre of professional court administrators-South
Carolina's courts are in remarkable conformity with the reform
literature, as delineated by the ABA standards. The changes have
enabled the Supreme Court to continually refine rules and procedures,
Volume 24, 1996 \ 217
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to allocate reources more efficiently, and to implement a coherent and
effective system of operating practices.
While, once again, South Carolina's judicial reformers have
reason to be proud of their accomplishments, clouds continue to lurk
on the horizon. True judicial independence-at least as it is articulated
by the ABA and other reform groups - cannot be achieved until
additional changes are made. One of the most troublesome facets of
the current arrangement is the continued ability of the General
Assembly to negate judicial rules if it so desires. Although legislators
have not used their powers to meddle with great frequency , the fight
over the Court of Appeals discussed earlier serves as an implicit
warning to the Supreme Court that the General Assembly might at any
time insert itself into the internal affairs of the unified court system.
Another impediment to independence arises from the court
systems' lack of control over many quasi-judicial personnel. Purists
within the court reform community contend that true self-determination
cannot be achieved until the judiciary exercises managerial supremacy
over all the employees who work within it. No other organ of
government is as dependent upon personnel who are provided by
external groups as are the courts . For example, courts rely upon the
services of court reporters and stenographers (who are often provided
by county government through contractual arrangements) , bailiffs (who
are supplied by elected sheriffs) , and deputy clerks (who are employed
by county government through the court clerks' offices) . Each of these
workers plays a significant role in the operation and maintenance of the
judicial system, yet none works directly for judges. This situation is
especially troublesome in regard to court clerks, who in South Carolina
are popularly elected within each county . These individuals are
important judicial actors in that they are responsible for courthouse
operations , recordkeeping, disposition of fines, and entry and
preservation of calendars and dockets . If an incompetent or even
illiterate court clerk happens to be elected- a scenario that has actually
occurred on occasion-the impact on the justice system can be quite
serious. 19 For this reason , court reformers strongly endorse the idea
that court clerks be appointed, not elected, and that other auxiliary
personnel be minimally subject to judicially-enforced performance
requirements.
218 / The Journal of Political Science
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The final shortcoming in the courts' attempt to achieve
independence stems from their continued dependence
upon the other
branches of government for financial support. All reform groupsagree
that judicial systems should be empowered to prepare and allocate their
own budgets, and that the state should completely fund judicial
expenditures. The fiscal status of South Carolina's courts, however,
continues to be highly decentralized. Many judicial personnel are paid
from county or city funds, and most of the state's judicial facilities are
maintained by local gov~rnment.-. Moreover, even that portion of the
court budget which is state-funded is the exclusive province of the other
branches. The State Budget and Control Board is responsible for
preparing the budget for consideration by the General Assembly. This
situation bas been an intermittent source of friction between the judicial
and legislative branches. A recurrent complaint is that the courts are
being "starved" by the legislature, an allegation that is substantiated by
unprecedented case backlogs at every level of the system. In response
to the court delay dilemma, and bolstered by a former Chief Justice's
comment that the courts are "overextended, understaffed, and
overwhelmed," the General Assembly added nine new judgeships early
in 1996.20
Relative to other states, South Carolina's method of financing
the courts is not very atypical. Of the reform proposals contained
within the ABA standards, state governments have been most reluctant
to institute full state financing of the judicial system. Likewise, there
bas not been a headlong rush to grant supreme courts unilateral control
over all budgetary matters. So, on this dimension at least, the state's
level of modernization does not lag significantly behind that which
exists elsewhere in the United States.

Judicial Selection: Tradition Reigns
Next to court unification, the most enduring theme of the
national court reform movement is merit selection of judges. This bas
been a central component of every reform proposal that bas been issued
in the past 50 years. 2 1 Although the specifics vary , the basic purpose
of merit selection is to establish a neutral screening system that
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emphasizes judicial candidates' qualifications and competence over
political considerations. Ordinarily, this is accomplished by turning the
screening process over to a nonpartisan nominating commission
composed of both laymen and legal professionals. Upon nomination ,
candidates are appointed by the governor , after which they typically
must stand for a retention election within a specified period of time
(usually one year) .22
Prior to the advent of the court reform movement, the judicial
selection stategies that were used in most states were little more than
accidents of history. That is, they reflected the ideas regarding judicial
selection that were dominant at the time the states' constitutions were
adopted. 23 Thus, states of the original 13 colonies favored legislative
election or gubernatorial appointment , while states that entered the
Union during the Jacksonian period opted for popular election . These
forms of selection did not begin to be displaced until the 1940s, when
the first merit plans were proposed. Since that time, 35 states have
implemented merit screening programs for some or all of their judges. 24
Of the nine states that once used legislative elections to select judges ,
only Virginia and South Carolina retain that format.
.
To assert that legislative election of judges has experienced a
"checkered past" is a gross understatement. As it has traditionally been
conducted, and as it carries on today , the process is perhaps the most
flawed and corrupt approach to judicial screening that has ever been
devised. Each judicial election reinforces disturbing lessons about the
system' s failings. Moreover, the legislature's "track record" in this
regard provides telling evidence that traditionalistic tendencies continue
to exert tremendous influence on the policymaking process.
The flaws of legislative selection, and the horror stories
surrounding particular contests for seats on the bench , are almost too
numerous to -detail here. First, consider the fact that 70 percent of the
circuit court judges, all of the Supreme Court justices, and three Court
of Appeals appointees are_former members of the General Assembly .
Given these figures, one can only conclude that legislative service is
almost a prerequisite for judicial appointment . When non-legislators
compete for positions on the bench, they almost always lose to
legislators. This situation clearly discourages many qualified applicants
from seeking judicial appointments , thereby narrowing the field to a
220 I The Journal of Political Science

South Carolina'sJudicialSystem
tiny group of well-connected politicians and their cronies.
Having already restricted the applicant pool, legislative
selection's next offense is to virtually ignore the qualifications of the
candidates for judicial office. Between 1992 and 1996, for instance,
the General Assembly re-elected two circuit judges who had been
reprimanded for ethical misconduct, elected a House member who was
deemed "unqualified" by the General Assembly's own judicial
screening committee, re-elected a circuit judge who most members
conceded "didn't understand the law," and elected an appellate court
judge who was evaluated as the least qualified of the three candidates
for that particular seat. Early in 1996, moreover, the General
Assembly elected a House member to a seat on the Court of Appeals
over another candidate who is widely regarded as the best circuit court
judge in the state. To make matters worse, the winning candidate
"flunked the bar exam twice, and was rated unqualified for the bench
by the state Bar. "25 Incidents such as these led one reform-oriented
legislator to remark, "The politics in judicial races defies gravity . . .
cream doesn't rise to the top, it goes to the bottom. "26
In addition to staffing the judiciary with judges who are
undoubtedly less qualified than they could be, legislative selection
results in many ugly displays that degrade the process. Because seats
on the bench are such valued plums, each selection is marked by strong
lobbying efforts, vote counting, "horse trading," and arm twisting.
Candidates for judgeships circulate through the State House, slapping
backs and collecting commitments for votes (even though it is
technically illegal for a candidate to ask for votes prior to being cleared
by the judicial screening committee).
The contests have become so politicized that, just recently, a
new and even more disturbing trend is developing. Candidates for reelection to the bench are increasingly facing opposition, a practice that
rarely occurred until the 1990s. Campaigns against minority judges
(especially women) appear to be particularly intense. The failure of a
family court judge to win re-election in 1995 marked the first time in
the current century that a sitting judge was removed by the General
Assembly. Soon thereafter, however, the General Assembly subjected
the only female Supreme Court justice to an embarrassing round of
public hearings. Despite being the acknowledged "intellectual giant" on
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the Court, she was forced to defend herself against charges that she
was too blunt and insensitive with her support staff. Lurking behind
the charade were allegations from some politicians that she was too
liberal, too "pro-tax," and that she had offended the Governor's father
by deciding against him in a civil case. Although she won re-election,
the process set off at least two alarm bells: that all judicial re-elections
will now be contested events, and that a judge 's political ideology and
decision history will become important considerations in future
elections. 27
The stink emanating from the General Assembly's recent
record of judicial elections is spurring renewed efforts to reform the
process. Although no one has seriously proposed a merit selection
protocol that removes the ultimate decision power from the legislature,
a House-passed measure would at least begin the reform process. The
bill would tighten qualifications for judges, prohibit sitting legislators
from running for the bench, establish an impartial commission of
laypersons and attorneys to nominate candidates, and deny any
candidate the right to run without the commission's approval . Because
a two-thirds majority of the Senate is needed to pass the measure (a
constitutional amendment), its prospects are dim. 28

Is the Verdict In?
Based on the accomplishments to date, can a definitive
judgment be rendered concerning the status of South Carolina's judicial
system?
Have they been reformed sufficiently to be termed
"modernized," or do traditionalistic values still dominate?
Weighing heavily on the positive side of the ledger is the
impressive assortment of court reforms that have been engineered
during the past three decades. Court consolidation and simplification
have progressed nicely, bringing order and continuity to a system that
was once irrational. The creation of a unified court system gives
judges many of the necessary tools to accomplish their tasks efficiently.
Centralized rule-making and administrative authority provide the court
system with the highest level of autonomy that has ever been present
in the state's courts.
Thus, both moralistic and individualistic
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objectives have clearly been achieved. The courts are far more
independent than they once were, and their performance and
accessibility to the public have unquestionably been improved. In a
very real sense, the progress hasbeen astounding. If evaluated purely
on the basis of the reforms that have occurred within the borders of the
state, even the most cynical observer would have to conclude that
traditionalism has yielded some of its influence.
If, on the other hand, one wishes to assess the South Carolina
experience in the context of other political settings, there is less cause
for optimism. Troublesome pockets of traditionalism remain in many
prominent facets of the judicial system. By far the most egregious is
legislative selection of judges, but other threats to the courts'
independence also persist in the rule-making process (where the
General Assembly retains veto power over the Supreme Court's
actions), financial affairs (where the unified court system's dependence
upon the other branches is nearly absolute), and in the management of
auxiliary personnel (who are often beyond the courts' direct
supervision).
In addition to these apparent shortcomings, South Carolina's
courts risk falling even further behind their counterparts in other states
in a number of emerging areas.
Perhaps the most notable
contemporary trend in court management is the explosion of efforts to
make state courts more accessible and responsive to the public. 29 Large
numbers of states have recently encouraged the use of "private
judging" (privately-retained mediators), ADR strategies (which are
publically funded) and night courts. These measures not only ease the
public's access to judicial services but also reduce backlog and delay,
a benefit that is sorely needed in South Carolina. Except for the
growing use of ADRs (especially in child custody, employee grievance,
and automobile accident cases), the state's use of such techniques is
fairly limited.
Other trends that seem to be commonplace elsewhere are
concerted programs to promote equity in the courts and to evaluate
judicial peformance. Task forces have been created in 39 states to
examine gender and racial bias in the justice system. 30 By e~amining
such processes as judicial selection, bail practices, sentencing, and the
handling of domestic violence cases, the states hope to mioimiu
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discriminatory procedures and behaviors.
Judicial performance
evaluation efforts, similarly, have the dual purpose of expanding citizen
participation in the judicial system while also improving the quality of
the judiciary. Typically, such programs encourage the public to get
involved in the review and evaluation of judicial performance, and in
filing complaints where misconduct is evident. South Carolina, in
contrast, has not yet launched any systematic anti-discrimination
program, and operates "one of the most secretive disciplinary processes
for judges and attorneys in the nation. "31 The openness of any
governmental system to public scrutiny and participation is an excellent
measure of progressivism and modernity; on this basis, South
Carolina's court system does not measure up.
One final aspect of judicial behavior deserves a brief mention.
Since the 1960s, courts in many locations have provided society's less
influential citizens with a voice that they are unable to obtain in the
other branches of government. Courts in conservative political cultures
tend to defend the status quo "through veto and delay, "32 while those
in more progressive settings have been active in furthering the rights
of the downtrodden. They innovate, develop new policy, and expand
the rights of litigants. This latter trend is especially prevalent in regard
to four classes of litigation: property law, contract law, tort law, and
civil liberties. 33 Insofar as South Carolina is concerned, a predictable
pattern is evident. Except for one case that opened government
jurisdictions to tort liability, 34 and another that was unusually gracious
to employees, 35 the state's judiciary has interpreted the law in a highly
narrow and conservative fashion. More often than not, the interests of
the established order prevail over those of the less well-connected.
In summary, then, a mixed verdict seems inescapable. South
Carolina has made substantial progress, but its courts do not yet reflect
the characteristics that would be expected in either a moralistic or
individualistic setting. Due to pressing economic demands, the most
likely direction of continuing change will be toward business-like
practices. Little resistance to the continued refinement of judicial
procedures, and the addition of labor-saving innovations, is likely to
occur. Opposition to modernization seems most probable where basic
"who gets what" questions are addressed. Therefore, we can expect
the General Assembly to resist merit selection and to strive mightily to
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maintain other controls over the judicial system. To the extent that the
legislators are successful, the state's courts will retain much of their
traditionalistic character.

Steven W . Hays is a professor of Political Science in the Department of
Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina.
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